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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - RIGHT TO
PRIVACY- CONTRACEPTIVES - MINORS- The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that a state-
funded family planning center's distribution of contraceptives to
minors without parental notice does not violate the parents' con-
stitutional rights.
Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829
(1980).
The Tri-County Family Planning Center (Center)' operated as
a family planning clinic serving Ingham County, Michigan,2 pro-
viding contraceptives3 and counseling services" to both minors'
and adults.6 Minors were served without regard to their eman-
cipation or whether they had received parental consent to obtain
contraceptives,' but were required to attend a rap session on
1. The Tri-County Family Planning Center, also known as the Ingham
County Family Planning Center, was operated by the Ingham County Health
Department under contract with the Michigan Department of Public Health.
Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198, 1200 (W.D. Mich. 1977), vacated and remanded,
559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1979).
2. Id. The Center was located in Lansing, Michigan. Doe v. Irwin, 615
F.2d 1162, 1163 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980). It served the coun-
ties of Ingham, Clinton, and Eaton. 428 F. Supp. at 1201.
3. Id. at 1202. The Center would provide qualifying minors with either
prescriptive or nonprescriptive birth control and birth control devices. Id. at
1202-03. No abortions or sterilizations were performed at the Center. 615 F.2d
at 1163.
4. See note 8 and accompanying text infra.
5. 428 F. Supp. at 1202. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals
defined the term "minor." See notes 55-57 and accompanying text infra.
6. 428 F. Supp. at 1201. In 1974 a study was made of age groups to which
the Center distributed contraceptives. Of a total of 1,392 females under the age
of 18, 623 were 17 years old, 466 were 16 years old, 210 were 15 years old, 74
were 14 years old, and 19 were 13 years old. The study showed that 88/o of the
minors to whom the Center distributed contraceptives lived at home, 76% were
students, 89% had intercourse prior to attending the Center, and 10% had been
pregnant at least once. Id. at 1202.
7. Id. at 1201-02. The Center did not publicize its providing contraceptives
to minors or encourage their attendance. Id. Although most contraceptive ser-
vices were available without parental consent, the Center would not insert an
intrauterine device within a minor unless parental consent had been obtained.
615 F.2d at 1163.
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reproduction and birth control8 before any of the Center's ser-
vices would be made available to them.' Following each rap ses-
sion, the Center's services were explained, and those interested
were advised to make appointments. 10 If minors, chose to return
to the Center, a medical history was taken and a physical ex-
amination was given." If no medical problems were discovered,
the minors were provided with contraceptives at no cost.'"
In 1973, the Does'13 sixteen-year-old daughter voluntarily
visited the Center to obtain contraceptives."' After attending a
rap session, giving a medical history, and submitting to a
physical examination, their daughter received contraceptives
without their knowledge or consent. 5
On April 7, 1975, the Does filed an action in a Michigan federal
district court'6 seeking a permanent injunction against the con-
tinuation of the Center's program of distributing contraceptives
to minors without parental knowledge or consent. 7 The district
8. 428 F. Supp. at 1204. Rap sessions were lectures lasting approximately
two and one-half hours dealing with human reproduction, the various methods
of birth control, the responsibilities of sexual activity, and the desirability of
communicating with parents. The sessions were held once each week and were
conducted by a social worker with a master's degree in social work. Almost all
of those who attended the sessions were female. 615 F.2d at 1163-64.
9. Id. at 1201.
10. Id. at 1204.
11. Id. The procedure conformed to the medical standards set by the
Michigan Department of Public Health and the United States Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare. Id. at 1202.
12. Id. In the event that an examination revealed medical complications,
the minor was referred to her family physician. Id.
13. The plaintiffs, Jane and John Doe, were joined by Thomas and Cora
Grost, parents of two teenage children who live in the area served by the
Center. 428 F. Supp. at 1200. On the plaintiffs' motion a class action was cer-
tified by the district court. The class consisted of parents in Ingham County
with children between puberty and majority under their custody who opposed
the distribution of contraceptives to their children without parental knowledge
or consent. 615 F.2d at 1163.
14. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3.
15. 428 F. Supp. at 1202.
16. Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1977), vacated and remanded,
559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1979). See note 13 supra. No explanation was reported
for the two-year gap between obtaining the contraceptives and bringing the
suit.
17. 428 F. Supp. at 1200. The original defendants included Marianne Davis,
Administrator of the Center, John Hazen, Medical Director, and George
Dellaportas, M.D., Director of the Ingham County Health Department and chief
administrator of the policies of the Center. All three were succeeded in office
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court granted the permanent injunction, finding that the parents'
constitutional right of privacy to care for and educate their
minor child was unreasonably interfered with by the state-
operated Center's 8 practice of distributing contraceptives to
minors without parental notification."
Centering its decision around the traditional role of parents,"
the district court concluded that familial values would be best
protected by encouraging minors to seek parental advice.21 The
court considered parents better suited to advise their minor
children regarding contraceptives22 and reasoned that because
only informed parents can participate in the minor's decision-
making process, the Center's practice of leaving parental
notification to the minor produced total parental exclusion.23 The
district court acknowledged the minor's right to privacy in areas
of procreation, but found that the right did not encompass access
to contraceptives without parental participation. In addition,
the court determined that the state's interest in the health and
welfare of its youth and in preventing unwanted teenage
pregnancies was not so compelling as to necessitate excluding
and substituted respectively as defendants by Cathy E. Irwin, George Gross,
D.O., and Mary Woods, R.N. Additional defendants included Elinor Holbrook,
Gilda Richardson, Marie Vande Bunte, and Ronald Peters as members of the
Ingham County Board of Health who affirmed the Center's policies. Id. at 1201.
18. Id. See note 1 supra.
19. 428 F. Supp. at 1214-15.
20. Id. The right of the parents to the custody, education, and control of
their minor children has become an established tradition. Id. at 1206 (citing
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
21. 428 F. Supp. at 1214-15. It is questionable whether the mandatory
parental notice requirement really encourages a minor to seek the aid of his
parents. See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1388 n.24 (7th Cir. 1978) (disclosure
of pregnancy may cause physical abuse); Women's Community Health Center,
Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 548 (D. Me. 1979) (disclosure can lead to paren-
tal pressure causing emotional and psychological distress, disruption of the
family unit, and physical risks to the minor); Goldstein, Medical Care for the
Child at Risk" On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645,
662 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein] (disclosure compels a female to con-
sult a parent when no trust exists). The Supreme Court, however, has stated
that the parents are recognized to act in the child's best interest. Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). The Court has also noted that it is the parents'
duty and right to prepare their children for additional obligations. Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
22. 428 F. Supp. at 1214-15.
23. Id. at 1214.
24. Id. at 1215.
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parents from the minor's decision on the contraceptive issue.5
Equating the Center's practices with a prohibition on parental
involvement and finding that the parental right to notice was un-
duly burdened, the district court prohibited further distribution
of contraceptives unless the state mandated parental notice as a
prerequisite.26 In the court's opinion, restricting a minor's
freedom to acquire contraceptives would be less burdensome
than excluding parents from these decisions.27
Shortly after the district court's decision, the Supreme Court
of the United States decided Carey v. Population Services Inter-
national,8 finding, in a plurality opinion, that a statutory prohibi-
tion against any distribution of contraceptives to minors under
the age of sixteen violated the minors' constitutional right to
privacy in decisions affecting procreation. 9 Thereafter, the
Center appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit which vacated and remanded the Doe v. Irwin deci-
sion to the district court for reconsideration of its notice require-
ment in light of the decision in Carey.3 0 Finding that Carey did
not warrant a different result because it produced no majority
opinion and some indication that a majority of the Supreme
Court would support a parental notice requirement,3 the district
25. Id. at 1214-15.
26. Id. at 1214.
27. Id.
28. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
29. In Carey a state statute prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to
minors under the age of 16. Justice Brennan noted that blanket prohibitions or
parental consent requirements prior to the distribution of birth control to
minors was violative of their constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 693-94 (opin-
ion of Brennan, J.). Although notice provisions were not at issue, Justice Bren-
nan indicated that all restrictions on a minor's access to contraceptives required
close constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 697 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
30. Doe v. Irwin, 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1979) (vacated and remanded
without published opinion).
31. Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1258 (W.D. Mich. 1977). The court cited
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), for the proposition that a failure by a
majority to agree on a point of law restricts the use of a case as authority.
After analyzing the opinion of each Justice in Carey, the district court felt that
its judgment would have been upheld by a majority of the Supreme Court. 441
F. Supp. at 1258. The court stated that its decision was consistent with the re-
cent approval by the Michigan State Legislature of a proposed statute requir-
ing parental notice before a minor could attend a reproductive health class in




court reasserted the parental right to participate in the con-
traceptive decisions of their minor children and re-adopted its
previous opinion and injunctive order.2
The Center again appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit for review of the district court's holding.' The
court of appeals concluded that the Center had no constitutional
obligation to notify parents prior to distributing contraceptives
to their minor children.' The judgment of the district court was
reversed and the complaint dismissed. 5
The court of appeals began its analysis by exploring three
separate sets of rights involved in the Doe v. Irwin decision: The
minor's right to privacy which embraced the right to obtain con-
traceptives;" the parents' fourteenth amendment right to the
care, custody, and nurture of their children;37 and the state's
right to protect the health and welfare of its youth, including the
32. 441 F. Supp. at 1261.
33. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980).
34. Id. at 1169.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1166. The court stated that it is the right of personal privacy
which is involved in obtaining the Center's services, and that within the most
intimate area of this right lies a woman's decisions concerning childbearing. Id.
See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973). Furthermore, it was a case involving a statute prohibiting the
use of contraceptives which first explicitly recognized the right of privacy. 615
F.2d at 1166 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). The court
determined that although the state's authority over the conduct of minors is
broader than over that of adults, minors nonetheless possess a constitutionally
protected right of privacy. 615 F.2d at 1166. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692-93 (1977) (opinion of
Brennan, J.); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75
(1976); Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1383-84 (7th Cir. 1978). This right of
privacy includes a minor's right to obtain contraceptives. 615 F.2d at 1166. See
Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
37. 615 F.2d at 1167. The fourteenth amendment protects the parents'
liberty interest in their children. Id See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(statute requiring school attendance unconstitutional with regard to Amish
religious requirement of foregoing one or two years of education); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (statute requiring minor to attend public
school is an unconstitutional interference with parents' right to educate minors
as they see fit); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute prohibiting
study of German language by minor unconstitutional interference with parents'
right to educate minors).
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prevention of teenage pregnancies.- The court found no need to
decide whether parental rights outweighed those of the minor
children as it determined that the voluntary nature of the Center
did not unconstitutionally interfere with parental rights.39 In the
court's opinion, the Center's practice was neutral, neither pro-
hibiting nor mandating parental involvement.40 The court distin-
guished the Supreme Court decisions defining parental rights,
cited as controlling by the district court, as either requiring or
prohibiting a particular activity.4 The Center merely operated a
voluntary birth control clinic with no requirement that minors
seek its services and no prohibition against participation by
parents.4" As a result, parents were free to exercise their tradi-
tional care, custody, and control over their minor children.
43
Because the court found no unconstitutional interference with
the parents' rights, it did not consider whether the state's in-
terest was compelling in this case.44
Recent decisions appear to lead minors capable of making inde-
pendent decisions to a new freedom to enjoy constitutional rights
taken for granted by adults, while restricting immature, uneman-
cipated minors to decisions made with parental approval.
4
Because the constitutional right to privacy is applicable to
minors as well as adults, 4 the right has been extended to encom-
pass a minor's decision to procreate, 47 obtain an abortion, 4 and
38. 615 F.2d at 1167. The court recognized -this as a legitimate state in-
terest which led Michigan to establish clinics such as the Center. IdL See
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
39. 615 F.2d at 1169.
40. Id. at 1168.
41. Id. See note 37 supra. In Wynn v. Carey the court found these same
cases not determinative of the constitutionality of a parental consent require-
ment prior to authorizing an abortion. 582 F.2d at 1385 & n.18. In each case the
parents' rights conflicted only with the state's interest, and the minor's rights
were not raised. Id. Therefore, the court found the cases not controlling when
the minor's rights conflict with those of the parents. Id.
42. 615 F.2d at 1168.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1169. The Does subsequently petitioned for a writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court but were denied. Doe v. Irwin, 449 U.S. 829
(1980).
45. See Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1042-43 (5th Cir.
1980).
46. Id. at 1042. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
47. See 582 F.2d at 1384 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972)).
48. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979).
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use contraceptives49 without unwarranted state intervention.2
Although the court of appeals in Doe v. Irwin did not character-
ize the rights of the parents and minors as conflicting,1 a minor's
right to obtain contraceptives without parental knowledge does
encroach upon the parents' right to participate in their minor
childrens' decisions. Therefore, by upholding the Center's prac-
tice and rejecting the district court's judicially mandated parental
notice provision, the decision of the court of appeals is consistent
with the recent line of cases that has slowly been qualifying
parental rights and carving out an area of individual autonomy
for minors.52
If the court of appeals had upheld the district court's deter-
mination that parents have a constitutional right to notice, it
would have been confronted with the problem of fashioning a
notice requirement that did not alternatively restrict the con-
stitutional rights of minors by being overly inclusive, ambiguous,
or by failing to provide for certain contingencies.' The district
court failed to define or qualify the term "minor" in its decision,
and courts have recently begun to invalidate notice provisions
that leave the term ambiguous, finding substantial differences
between children, adolescents, and mature teenagers.' In a re-
cent United States Supreme Court decision, Justice Powell found
that a provision failing to distinguish between a minor capable of
making independent decisions and one incapable of doing so was
an unconstitutional infringement of the minor's rights.' A paren-
tal notice provision may not be necessary in the case of a mar-
ried female minor, but an exclusion of married persons from the
49. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
50. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 nn.24-26 (1977).
51. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
52. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
53. See notes 54-62 and accompanying text infra.
54. 582 F.2d at 1383 n.11; 428 U.S. at 74 (state-defined age does not give
automatic maturity or a sudden constitutional right).
55. In Bellotti v. Baird Justice Powell defined a minor in two ways: Those
capable of giving informed consent with independent decisionmaking ability,
and those incapable of doing so. He felt it inappropriate for a parental notifica-
tion statute to provide the same requirements for both of these types of
minors. Justice Powell used the term "children" throughout his reasoning about
why a child's right cannot always be equated with an adult's. 443 U.S. at 630-47.
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requirement could subject the provision to an equal protection
argument.'
The district court failed to provide for certain contingencies:
The manner in which notice should be given;57 the consequences
of repeated failures to notify a parent;58 and special cir-
cumstances where parental notice may not be in the minor's best
interest. 9 Although it is traditionally accepted that parents
naturally act in their child's best interest,0 contingencies must
still be provided for when a parent fails to so act. As Justice
Powell admonished, failure to provide for any contingencies
where notification may be contrary to the minor's best interest
renders a notice requirement unconstitutionally overinclusive.61
Parental notice requirements have been a constant source of
litigation in the federal courts."2 While some courts have found
the notice provision constitutional, 3 others have found it to be an
56. See 582 F.2d at 1387 (unconstitutional violation of the minor's right to
equal protection to exclude married minors from requirement of parental
notification); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975) (married
minors not necessarily more mature or responsible than unmarried minors).
57. 428 F. Supp. at 1214. Notice must be provided "in some manner." Id.
58. A Utah statute requiring parental notice prior to a minor's receiving an
abortion contained the provision: "notify, if possible." H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398, 400 (1981) (construing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1978)). This was
interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court to mean the physician would notify
parents "if under the circumstances, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, he
can ascertain their identity and location and it is feasible or practicable to give
them notification." 450 U.S. at 405.
59. See note 21 supra. The dissent in Matheson acknowledged a number of
instances when parental notice will not be in the minor's best interest. 450 U.S.
at 437-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
61. In Bellotti v. Baird Justice Powell found a parental notification provi-
sion unconstitutional for failing to provide procedures for determining whether
nondisclosure would be in a minor's best interest. 443 U.S. at 646-51. Wynn v.
Carey, an abortion case, cited examples where notification would not be in the
minor's best interest: physical abuse on disclosure, forced marriages, or com-
pelled continuation of pregnancy as punishment. 582 F.2d at 1388 n.24. In
Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen the plaintiffs expert witness
stated that disclosure can lead to parental pressure causing emotional and
psychological distress, disruption of the family unit, physical risks to the minor,
and either delayed assistance or illegal abortions. 477 F. Supp. at 548. With the
exceptions of compelled pregnancy and delayed or illegal abortions, these same
justifications for not notifying parents are also present in contraceptive cases.
62. See notes 63 & 64 infra.
63. See 441 F. Supp. at 1261; T.H. v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873, 882 (D. Utah
1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 986 (1976) (dicta that a state parental notification provision
would be constitutional if applied nondiscriminately).
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unconstitutional infringement of the minor's right to privacy on
decisions affecting procreation." The Supreme Court of the
United States has recently resolved the constitutionality of a
parental notice provision as a condition precedent to a minor's
right to obtain an abortion. 5 After the court of appeals decided
Doe v. Irwin, the Supreme Court found in H.L. v. Matheson"
that a Utah statute requiring parental notice, if possible, prior to
performing an abortion was constitutional at least as applied to
immature, unemancipated minors. 7 Because the Supreme Court
cautioned that its holding in Matheson could not be used to in-
timate or predict its view as to the proper resolution of a future
case,68 the Court has not squarely considered the constitutionali-
ty of requiring parental notice prior to the distribution of con-
traceptives.
Several of the state's interests in a minor's decision on
whether to have an abortion are significantly different from
those in decisions to use cortraceptives 9 In Matheson, the state
encouraged minors to seek the advice of their parents before an
abortion because parents ordinarily possess information about
the child that can help a physician exercise his best medical
judgment. 0 Also, minors may not understand the consequences
of an abortion decision, which are of a permanent nature.7' In ad-
dition, the emotional stress and long range consequences of an
64. See Womens Services, P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Neb. 1979),
aff'd, 636 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1980) (statute requiring informed consent and par-
ental consultation prior to minor's abortion unconstitutional); Planned Parent-
hood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (statute that required
parental notice in abortion decision unconstitutional); Scheinberg v. Smith, 482
F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (statute requiring parental consent or court order
unconstitutional as is a spousal notice provision in abortion decision); Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) (ordinance requiring parental notice and consent in abortion decision
of minor unconstitutional for not providing alternative that would be in the
minor's best interest); Jones v. Smith, 474 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (state
statute requiring unmarried pregnant female under age 18 to receive parental
consent or a court order prior to abortion unconstitutional).
65. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 413.
68. Id. at 414 n.25.
69. See id. at 407-13.
70. Id. at 405. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1972).
71. 405 U.S. at 409-10.
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abortion make parental consultation desirable as it is unlikely
that a minor can receive adequate counsel and support from a
physician."
Prior to Matheson, the Supreme Court had considered the
principles developed in abortion cases equally applicable to con-
traceptive cases.73 However, given the emphasis in Matheson
that the Supreme Court has placed on the unique nature of an
abortion decision" and the less critical nature of a decision to use
contraceptives, the effect of Matheson on Doe v. Irwin's refusal
to judicially mandate a contraceptive notification provision is not
certain.
While the developing rights of minors have been viewed as the
cause of a gradual destruction of the family unit, replacing the
state as parent," it may also be a means of strengthening the
family bond, encouraging children to confide in parents without
feeling pressure. Nonetheless, parental authority to direct and
educate children is a part of our culture,77 and protecting the
right of parents to make decisions for their minor children can-
not be accomplished without interfering with the rights of the
minor to some degree."
If the Matheson decision is extended to cases involving the
72. Id. at 410.
73. In Carey v. Population Services Int'l the Court cited the principles set
forth in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), an abortion case, as
applicable to Carey, a contraceptive case. 431 U.S. at 688.
74. Medical decisions on electing to carry the child to term are not nearly
as grave emotionally or psychologically as an abortion decision. 405 U.S. at 412.
"There are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an impor-
tant decision will have consequences so grave and indelible." Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. at 646.
75. See Note, Parent, Child, and the Decision to Abort: A Critique of the
Supreme Court's Statutory Proposal in Bellotti v. Baird, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
1869, 1887-88 (1979): "True personal autonomy is more probably ensured by con-
tinuing parental control and input. [T]o the extent that the state rescues the
child from parental decisions it finds repugnant, it impeaches the parents' own
judgment and authority. [Flamilial estrangement can only lead to the
individual's further isolation and loneliness ...."
76. See Goldstein, supra note 21, at 661-62 ("[Tihose who insist on parental
consent are concerned less with the child's well being than with strengthening
their general opposition to abortion, which they cloak in the magical notion that
law can improve family communications by compelling a young woman in trou-
ble to consult her parents when such family trust does not exist.").
77. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
78. See notes 55-62 supra.
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distribution of contraceptives to minors, the parental right to
direct and control the education of such minors will be pre-
served."9 Legislation mandating parental notification, at least in
the case 'of immature, unemancipated, and dependent minors,
would give each set of rights-the state's, the parents', and the
minors' - substantive effect without enforcing one to the exclu-
sion of the others.
Wendy T. Weil
79. 428 F. Supp. 1213-14.

